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Choice, Conscience, and Context
by
MARY A. CROSSLEY*
To begin, Professor Shapiro should be commended for challeng-
ing each of the participants in this Symposium to assess our arguments
with some analytical rigor, checking them to make sure they do not
suffer from the systematic errors that he has articulated.1 He admon-
ishes us that the value laden nature of discussions about how the new
reproductive technologies affect our understanding of personhood is
not an excuse for sloppy analysis and we should heed this counsel.
When it comes to substance, I basically agree with Professor Shapiro's
conclusion that the broad lines of criticisms he addresses-criticisms
based on charges of selfishness, objectification, and violation of the
second formulation of Kant's categorical imperative-are not by
themselves up to the task of convincingly condemning and justifying
the prohibition of new reproductive techniques and collaborations
(NRTCs) across the board.2 Instead, as Professor Shapiro argues, we
need to conduct more particularized assessments of specific practices.3
Rather than respond directly to each of Professor Shapiro's
points, however, I would like to build on his discussion to consider
two specific practices that increasingly are becoming part of the new
reproductive landscape: selective reduction of multiple pregnancy
and prenatal genetic testing to enable selective abortion. Professor
Shapiro does not directly address either practice, but each may raise
troubling questions that sound suspiciously like the arguments that
Professor Shapiro has sought to discredit. The concerns that selective
reduction and prenatal genetic screening raise, however, relate not to
why and in what circumstances persons employ NRTCs in order to
become genetic parents, but to the nature and consequences of the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law;, B.A., 1984, University of Virginia; J.D., 1987, Vanderbilt University.
1. See Michael H. Shapiro, Illicit Reasons and Means For Reproduction: On Exces-
sive Choice and Categorical and Technological Imperatives, 47 HASINGs L.J. 1081,1087-91
(1996).
2. Id. at 1087.
3. 1d. at 1090-91.
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actions that persons undertake in order to achieve that goal. Still,
these practices may be troubling precisely because of the effects they
may have on our understanding of personhood. 4 After discussing
these two practices, I will consider a practical response suggested by
my concerns.
1. Selective Reduction of Multiple Pregnancy
Selective reduction of multiple pregnancy5 is a procedure now
available to many women who find themselves encountering a multi-
ple pregnancy6 as a result of infertility treatment. Most multiple
pregnancies, particularly high order multiple pregnancies in which a
woman carries three or more fetuses, do not occur naturally, but are
instead iatrogenic in nature.7 Multiple pregnancies usually result from
the use of infertility drugs that hyperstimulate the ovaries to produce
multiple eggs. This hyperstimulation may be followed either by in-
semination or by in vitro fertilization and the transfer of multiple em-
4. As several participants at this Symposium have argued, we may have good cause
to be concerned about the new reproductive technologies for reasons other than the im-
pact of those technologies on personhood. See generally Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technology and the Threat to the Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951 (1996)
(expressing concern regarding impact on family); Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and
the Culture of Motherhood, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 967 (1996) (expressing concern regarding
impact on women); Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 935 (1996) (expressing concern regarding role that race plays). In my comments, I
limit myself to concerns relating to personhood.
5. The procedure is also referred to as "multifetal pregnancy reduction" and "selec-
tive termination." See Mark I. Evans et al., Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction and Selective
Termination, 7 CURRENT OPINIONS OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 126, 126-28 (1995) [here-
inafter MFPR and Selective Reduction]; Judith F. Daar, Selective Reduction of Multiple
Pregnancy: Lifeboat Ethics in the Womb, 25 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 773, 779 n.26 (1992).
6. In my comments, I focus on the use of selective termination of fetal life as a re-
sponse to the medical exigencies created by high order multiple pregnancies. The proce-
dure described, however, may also be used when one fetus in a twin pregnancy is
diagnosed with a physical or genetic abnormality. See Evans, MFPR and Selective Reduc-
tion, supra note 5, at 128 (describing "selective termination for fetuses with congenital
abnormalities"). Although the response (i.e., selective termination) may be the same in
each scenario, the rationale is different: "[T]he intention in selective termination is to
avoid having a child with a known medical problem, whereas the intention in multifetal
reduction is to prevent problems that are secondary to multifetal gestation and premature
birth." Richard V. Grazi & Joel B. Wolowelsky, Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction and Dis-
posal and Untransplanted Embryos in Contemporary Jewish Law and Ethics, 165 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1268, 1270 (1991) (quoting AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTE-
TRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, MULTIFETAL PREGNANCY REDUCTION AND SELECTIVE
FETAL TERMINATION, COMMITEE OPINION No. 94 (Apr. 1991)).
7. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 203 (1994). Cf Evans, MFPR
and Selective Reduction, supra note 5, at 126 (relating increasing rate of multiple births to
development of assisted reproductive technology).
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bryos to the woman.8 Estimates are that about twenty-five percent of
pregnancies resulting from fertility treatment are multiple
pregnancies; 9 the percentage runs as high as fifty percent in some
programs. 10
High order multiple pregnancy creates serious health risks for
both the pregnant woman and the fetuses she is carrying. Among the
increased risks that a woman with a multifetal pregnancy faces are
preeclampsia, postpartum hemorrhage, preterm labor, and premature
delivery. She is also likely to require long-term bedrest or hospitaliza-
tion during the pregnancy.1' The risks to the fetuses are more dra-
matic. Each additional fetus in a pregnancy increases both the risks of
premature delivery, with its resultant problems of low birth weight
and respiratory distress syndrome for the infant, and the rate of per-
inatal and infant death. The risks associated with premature delivery
often cause long-term impairments for the infants who survive.'2 In
addition to these health risks, women and couples encountering high
order multiple pregnancies face daunting social, financial, and per-
sonal burdens in caring for their offspring, even if, against the odds,
their offspring suffer no long-term impairments. 13 Faced with these
8. See Mark I. Evans et al., Evolving Patterns of fatrogenic Multifetal Pregnancy Gen-
eration: Implications for Aggressiveness of Infertility Treatments, 172 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1750, 1752 (1995) (describing procedures) [hereinafter Evolving Patterns].
9. See Antoinette Martin, Is Society Really Ready for More Multiples?, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 1996, at 1, B6.
10. Evans, MFPR and Selective Termination, supra note 5, at 126. The majority of
these multiple pregnancies are twin pregnancies and not high order multiple pregnancies
for which selective reduction might be recommended. Data from 1993 indicate that of
pregnancies resulting from in vitro fertilization (IVF) or related technologies, approxi-
mately 6% to 7% were high order multiple pregnancies. See Society for Assisted Repro-
ductive Technology, Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States and Canada:
1993 Results Generated from the American Society for Reproductive Medicine/Society for
Assisted Reproductive Technology Registry, 64 FERTILrry & STERntrmy 13, 14-17 (1995).
See also Martin, supra note 9, at B1 (stating that the number of supertwin births has in-
creased at a rate faster than twin births).
11. See Mark I. Evans et al., Multiple Gestation: The Role of Multifetal Pregnancy
Reduction and Selective Termination, 19 CLINICS PERINATOLOGY 345, 352 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Multiple Gestation]; Mark I. Evans et al., Attitudes on the Ethics of Abortion, Sex Selec-
tion, and Selective Pregnancy Termination among Health Care Professionals, Ethicists, and
Clergy Likely to Encounter Such Situations, 164 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1092,
1097 (1990) [hereinafter Attitudes].
12. See Daar, supra note 5, at 778-79; Evans, MFPR and Selective Termination, supra
note 5, at 126; Martin, supra note 9, at B6 (stating that the rate of cerebral palsy in multiple
births is six times that for singletons).
13. See generally Martin, supra note 9 (describing the burdens that multiple births
place on families and society).
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risks and potential burdens, the woman (or couple) 14 has three op-
tions: (1) terminate the entire pregnancy through abortion and at-
tempt to conceive again; (2) seek to continue the pregnancy with all
the fetuses, despite the risks; or (3) reduce the fetuses to a number
that poses a lower level of risk.15
For those women who choose selective reduction, the procedure
is performed during the first trimester of pregnancy and most com-
monly involves the insertion of a needle through the abdominal wall
and the injection of potassium chloride into the thorax of one or more
of the fetuses.16 Ordinarily, the physician chooses the fetus(es) to be
terminated based on proximity to the abdominal wall1 7 and terminates
as many as are necessary to leave only two, or perhaps three, fetuses
surviving. 18
The existing medical, ethical, and legal literature contains only
limited discussion of the ethical issues that selective reduction raises. 19
14. In the discussion that follows, I will use both the terms "woman" and "couple" in
describing the actors employing reproductive technology. I use the term "couple" deliber-
ately, particularly with respect to selective reduction, for the vast majority of high order
multiple pregnancies are the result of infertility treatment and the vast majority of recipi-
ents of infertility treatment are married couples By using the term "couple," however, I
do not intend to denigrate the woman's (at least theoretical) role as the ultimate voice in
decisions regarding her own reproductive capacity.
15. See Evans, Multiple Gestation, supra note 11, at 347.
16. See id. at 348-49. Recent data indicate that alternative methods involving trans-
cervical aspiration or transvaginal needle injection of potassium chloride into the fetal tho-
rax are as safe and effective as the transabdominal procedure in reducing the number of
fetuses. See Ilan E. Timor-Tritsch et al., Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction by Transvaginal
Puncture: Evaluation of the Technique Used in 134 Cases, 168 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY 799, 803 (1993); Mark I. Evans et al., Transabdominal Versus Transcervical and
Transvaginal Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction: International Collaborative Experience of
More Than One Thousand Cases, 170 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 902, 905 (1994).
17. Evans, Multiple Gestation, supra note 11, at 349 ("The decision of which embryo
to choose has been strictly a technical issue of which embryos are easiest to reach."). In
these cases, the "selection" involved in selective reduction does not raise eugenic concerns.
The medical literature, however, also suggests that "physicians performing the procedure
will select an embryo that appears to be significantly smaller or one which appears to be
anomalous." Evans, MFPR and Selective Termination, supra note 5, at 128.
18. Most reductions are to two fetuses. ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 204; Evans,
Multiple Gestation, supra note 11, at 350. It appears that most obstetricians are not willing
to reduce to a singleton pregnancy because the pregnancy outcomes for twin births are
nearly as good as for singletons. See Richard M. Zaner et al., Selective Termination in
Multiple Pregnancies: Ethical Considerations, 54 FERTILITY & STERILITY 203, 204 (1990).
By the same token, as the outcomes for triplets improve, some physicians may express
ethical qualms about reducing the number of fetuses in a pregnancy below three. See ROB-
ERTSON, supra note 7, at 204.
19. For discussions that pay more than passing notice to ethical issues, see, for exam-
ple, ROBERTSON, supra note 7; Daar, supra note 5; Evans, Attitudes, supra note 11; Grazi &
Wolowelsky, supra note 6; Christine Overall, Selective Termination of Pregnancy and Wo-
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To the extent that ethical concerns are addressed, many commentators
begin their analysis at the point when multiple pregnancy is already
established and either analogize to the morality and legality of abor-
tion generally20 or focus on the ethical permissibility of destroying
some life in order to protect other life.21 From the latter perspective,
high order multiple pregnancies may be seen as creating a lifeboat
situation, in which one fetal life may be sacrificed to save others.22
To my mind, however, a more fundamental ethical issue arises
not once a high order multiple pregnancy is established, but when per-
sons choose a course of conduct creating a substantial risk of high
order multiple pregnancy.P To draw on the lifeboat metaphor, it
seems we would view as morally troubling the decision of a ship's cap-
tain to set sail in stormy seas in a rickety boat without a radio. This
decision is disturbing not only because it poses a risk of physical harm
to the ship's passengers and crew, but also because it risks placing
those persons in a lifeboat situation where they face grave mortal de-
cisions. By the same token, the use of aggressive infertility treatments
entailing hyperovulation followed by insemination or multiple embryo
transfer raises ethical questions because that treatment choice will-
ingly entertains the risk that high order multiple pregnancy will result.
Two lines of reasoning, which are unlikely to coincide in a single
case, explain why this willing entertainment of risk may be troubling.
The first line of reasoning applies when a couple understands the risk
of multiple pregnancy and the availability of selective reduction and
they choose to pursue aggressive infertility treatment that maximizes
their chance of a live birth.24 Thus, in order to achieve their goal of
men's Reproductive Autonomy, HASTNoS CENTER REP., May-June 1990, at 10-11; Zaner,
supra note 18.
20. See Evans, Multiple Gestation, supra note 11, at 352-53; Elizabeth Villiers Gem-
mette, Selective Pregnancy Reduction: Medical Attitudes, Legal Implications, and a Viable
Alternative, 16 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 383, 387-90 (1991).
21. See ag., Daar, supra note 5; Grazi & WoloweIsky, supra note 6.
22. Daar, supra note 5.
23. Cf. ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 205 ("The avoidability of the need.., poses
more difficult issues.").
24. In using the phrase "aggressive infertility treatment," I refer to treatment
designed to maximize the chances of pregnancy. By calculating the dosage of ovulation
induction drugs or transferring large numbers of embryos to a woman, a physician maxi-
mizes the chance of pregnancy, but also increases the risk of multiple pregnancy. The
medical literature suggests that the development of selective reduction procedures has en-
couraged some fertility specialists to become more aggressive. See Evans, Evolving Pat-
terns, supra note 8, at 1753 ("[I]t is... abundantly clear that for a small group of physicians
and centers the use of ovulation-stimulating medications is very cavalier, with reduction
seen as a relatively unimportant side effect of aggressive infertility therapy.").
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producing a child genetically related to one or both of them, the
couple deliberately seeks to create, and is potentially willing to delib-
erately destroy, fetal life.
In this scenario, a possible ethical affront lies in what Professor
Shapiro calls "selfishness." He describes selfish conduct as creating a
disproportionate risk of harms to others in order to advance the ac-
tor's personal needs or goals.25 Here, one could argue that advance-
ment of the goal sought-the creation of a child genetically related to
its parents-creates a disproportionate risk of harm. One obvious po-
tential harm is the termination of fetal life. The question of the mag-
nitude of this harm lies at the center of the abortion debate, and
attempts to achieve complete agreement on this question are almost
certainly in vain. Nonetheless, even persons who disagree on the ab-
solute level of harm associated with terminating fetal life may agree
that the proportionality of the harm varies depending on the context
in which the choice to terminate is made.26 Were the loss of fetal life
itself the only potential harm threatened by aggressive infertility treat-
ment, it would be difficult to distinguish that treatment from an indi-
vidual's decision to engage in unprotected sexual intercourse without
a willingness to procreate. In both scenarios, the actors apparently
assume a risk that the termination of fetal life may become necessary
to achieve the actors' life goals. One might conclude that the assump-
tion of that risk in the infertility treatment scenario is less troubling
because it reflects an ardent (possibly selfless?) desire to create new
life, as opposed to mere irresponsibility.
From another perspective, however, it is this very intent of the
couple to create the fetal life that they are then willing to destroy that
can be seen as risking an additional, symbolic harm. The image of
persons desirous of being parents who deliberately create life, only to
turn around and destroy the life just created, may have a powerful
symbolic impact.27 Furthermore, the use of aggressive infertility treat-
ment smacks of a willingness on the couple's part to use human life,
albeit unborn human life, instrumentally for no purpose other than to
advance their own ends.28 This threatened symbolic harm too must be
25. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at text accompanying note 65.
26. For example, many persons with varying beliefs regarding the moral status of the
fetus would likely agree that abortion is less troubling morally when a pregnancy threatens
a woman's life than when a pregnancy threatens a woman's vacation plans.
27. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at Part IX (discussing relevance of arguments based on
symbolism).
28. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at Part IV (discussing instrumental use of persons). It is
not entirely clear exactly how Professor Shapiro would apply the second formulation of
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
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considered in balancing the goal sought against the potential harms
wrought. From this perspective, prospective parents' decision to use
aggressive infertility treatment to maximize their chance for "success,"
while contemplating the availability of selective reduction should their
efforts produce an overabundance of fetal life, may better fit Profes-
sor Shapiro's description of selfishness than, for example, a postme-
nopausal woman's decision to bear a child or a man's hiring a woman
to act as a "surrogate" mother.29
By contrast, when a couple pursues aggressive infertility treat-
ment without first having been fully informed of the risk of multiple
pregnancy and the availability and nature of selective reduction, the
treatment decision should give us ethical pause for a different reason.
Although the medical literature's discussions of selective reduction do
at times note the need to provide infertility patients with this informa-
tion, anecdotal accounts from infertility patients indicate that the first
time some couples learn about selective reduction is when a high or-
der multiple pregnancy has already been diagnosed.30 In these cases,
the physician's failure to communicate places the couple in the posi-
tion of having to make a grave moral decision-a position they might
have chosen to avoid had they been informed prior to the commence-
ment of treatment. Even worse is the scenario in which fertility spe-
cialists obtain consent to perform selective reduction of a multiple
pregnancy without accurately advising a couple whose religion con-
demns abortion of the procedure's nature.31
Kant's categorical imperative (the "Formula") in this context. On the one hand, he sug-
gests that the Formula's mandate to treat humanity as ends, and not means, "probably
includes fetuses scheduled to be born." Id. at text accompanying note 153. On the other
hand, his discussion of the Ayala case describes an aborted fetus as "not otherwise sched-
uled to be born." Id. at text accompanying note 208. Thus, he seems to suggest, without
making explicit his rationale, that only fetal life that is not deliberately terminated should
be part of the Formula's calculus.
29. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at Parts II1D2 and IIID4 (discounting selfishness argu-
ment in these scenarios).
30. See eg., Kevin Simpson, Modern Technology of Fertility Drove the Hardest Bar-
gain, DENVER POST, July 18, 1995, at B1. Cf Daar, supra note 5, at 739 (quoting physician
who said he does not inform infertility patients of the possible need for and availability of
selective reduction before commencing treatment).
31. In her comments at the Symposium, Janet Benshoof, President of the Center for
Reproductive Law & Policy, alluded to one program in Utah where physicians transferred
eight embryos to a woman and then, when she was diagnosed with a high-order multiple
pregnancy, advised her that they could "take care of it" without explicitly informing her
that the proposed solution involved terminating fetal life. Janet Benshoof, Address at the
Hastings Law Journal Symposium (Feb. 10, 1996).
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Cases in which aggressive infertility treatment is pursued without
true informed consent are emblematic of the harms that can flow from
a "system" of infertility treatment too often powered by the twin en-
gines of desire: the providers' desire for profit and prestige and infer-
tile couples' desire for genetically related children. 32 More seems to
be at stake here than in a garden variety informed consent case. The
failure to inform infertility patients of the risks, including medical,
psychological, 33 social, and ethical risks, of multiple pregnancy and se-
lective reduction represents a more serious affront to the patients' dig-
nity as autonomous individuals-to their personhood-than does a
failure to inform in a case involving risks more purely medical in na-
ture. This is true because, as developed below, respect for autonomy
is most vital to personhood when the decision at issue involves not
simply any choice among alternatives, but a choice that implicates an
individual's deeply held values and beliefs.
11. Prenatal Genetic Testing
Unlike selective reduction, which remains an extreme response
employed in a relatively small number of cases, prenatal genetic test-
ing to enable selective abortion for genetic anomalies has become part
of standard obstetrical practice, both as an adjunct to assisted repro-
duction and in prenatal medical care more generally.34 As part of this
Symposium, Professor Andrews has provided impressive empirical
support for a variety of impacts that prenatal genetic testing can have
on women. 35 Further consideration of the practice, however, is appro-
priate in response to Professor Shapiro, for prenatal genetic testing
32. See Trip Gabriel, High-Tech Pregnancies Test Hope's Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1996, at 1.
33. See Patricia Schreiner-Engel et al., First Trimester Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction:
Acute and Persistent Psychologic Reactions, 172 AM. J. OBSTETRrcs & GYNECOLOGY 541,
545-46 (1995) (assessing the emotional reactions and attitudes of women who underwent
selective reduction).
34. See Lois Shephard, Protecting Parents' Freedom to Have Children with Genetic
Differences, U. ILL. L. REv. 761, 776 (1995) (stating that prenatal testing has been elevated
to the standard of care found in reproductive health care); Abby Lippman, Prenatal Ge-
netic Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs and Reinforcing Inequities, 17 AM. J.L. &
MED. 15, 19 (1991) ("Prenatal diagnosis, already designated a 'ritual' of pregnancy, at least
for white, middle-class women in North America, is the most widespread application of
genetic technology to humans today."). See generally Michael J. Malinowski, Coming into
Being: Law, Ethics, and the Practice of Prenatal Genetic Screening, 45 HASTINGs L.J. 1435
(1994). Some of the concerns discussed herein with respect to prenatal genetic testing may
also be raised by preimplantation genetic testing and pre- or postnatal gene therapy for
enhancement purposes if those practices come to be widely available.
35. See generally Andrews, supra note 4.
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often engenders critiques raising selfishness and objectification con-
cerns of the type he describes. These critiques argue that prospective
parents are acting to further their own selfish desires and to satisfy
their consumeristic preferences by seeking to influence the traits that
their offspring will have. Critics further fear that those actions will
erode the ideally noncontingent bonds between parent and child.36
In addition, persons concerned with societal attitudes toward per-
sons with disabilities have voiced the argument that prenatal genetic
testing and selective abortion reinforce oppressive attitudes toward
persons with disabilities and implicitly devalue persons with those
traits tested for.37 The message sent, from this perspective, is that a
child with the condition would be unacceptable to the prospective par-
ents. This devaluation appears more subtly in the promotion of pre-
natal genetic testing as allowing prospective parents to ensure that
they will have "healthy" children. 38 This rhetoric of good health fails
to acknowledge that some traits screened for do not necessarily affect
a child's health, although they may impair the child's abilities.39 A
perfectly healthy child with Down syndrome or with deafness comes
to mind. Viewed in this light, the appeal to good health, while unob-
jectionable on its face, may promote eugenic attitudes that individuals
36. See Nancy (Ann) Davis, Reproductive Technologies and Our Attitudes Towards
Children, 9 LOGOS 51, 59-60 (1988); cf Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin,
The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REv. 313, 320 (1992) ("With the availability of
new reproductive technologies, choosing a baby can become like catalog shopping.");
Lippman, supra note 34, at 23 ("Prenatal diagnosis does approach children as consumer
objects subject to quality control.").
37. See Adrienne Asch, Reproductive Technology and Disability, in REPRODUCriVE
LAWS FOR THE 1990s 69,83-85 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989); Marsha Saxton,
Prenatal Screening and Discriminatory Attitudes about Disability, 13 WOMEN & HEALTH
217 (1988); Angus Clarke, Is Non-Directive Genetic Counselling Possible?, 338 LANCET
998, 1000-01 (1991).
38. See generally Laura Purdy, Loving Future People, in REPRODUCION, ETHICS AND
THE LAW 300,313 (Joan Callahan ed., 1995); cf. Malinowski, supra note 34, at 1453 (noting
medicalization of choices created by prenatal genetic testing and the premium our society
places on normalcy). Moreover, as Ruth Hubbard has pointed out, focusing on prenatal
testing and selective abortion to promote healthy children ignores that maternal age and
poverty, and not genetics, are the main predictors of disability or disease for newborns and
young children. "It makes no sense to be putting resources into learning how to diagnose
relatively rare diseases so as to prevent the babies who have them from being born, while
we permit potentially healthy babies to be disabled for reasons that are well understood
and preventable." Ruth Hubbard, Eugenics: New Tools, Old Ideas, 13 WOMEN & HEALTH
225, 233 (1988).
39. Cf. Saxton, supra note 37, at 221-22 (making similar point regarding the stereo-
type associating "suffering" and disability).
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with some disabilities are properly excludable, not only from society,
but also from existence.40
A third, less often voiced concern regarding prenatal genetic test-
ing and selective abortion is that the practice encourages reductivism.
This point draws on the theory of cognition that practices may have
learning effects on social attitudes, a theory of described elsewhere by
Professor Shapiro.41 Here, the concern is that using prenatal testing
for trait selection (or deselection) purposes will encourage the identi-
fication of a specific child with his selected trait(s) or, more generally,
the identification of all persons with their selectable traits.4 2 The iden-
tification of individuals primarily with a single, physical trait rather
than with their personhood is precisely opposed to disability rights
advocates' efforts to promote "people first" language in describing
persons with disabilities.43
Even if the practice of prenatal genetic testing and selective abor-
tion does not lead society to reduce individuals to a single selectable
trait, the proliferation of the practice may more subtly encourage soci-
ety to disassemble persons (or, more properly, the concept of per-
40. Cf Hubbard, supra note 38, at 231-32 (characterizing as eugenic the idea that
humans have "any right to determine who should and should not inhabit the world");
Lippman, supra note 34, at 24-25 (characterizing disclaimer of eugenic motive as
disingenuous).
41. See Michael H. Shapiro, Fragmenting and Reassembling the World Of Flying
Squirrels, Augmented Persons, and Other Monsters, 51 Orno ST. L.J. 331, 352 (1990) [here-
inafter Flying Squirrels]; see generally Michael H. Shapiro, How (Not) to Think About Sur-
rogacy and Other Reproductive Innovations, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 647 (1994).
42. Susan Wolf recently made this point in the context of discussing health insurers'
use of genetic information about individuals:
[Tihe social practice [of drawing genetic conclusions about individuals] involves
creating genetic categories, actively looking for any kind of information about
people in order to sort them into those categories, and harboring attitudes and
prejudices that motivate such behavior. Thus, it is systematic, not just individual;
a matter of cognitive mindset, not just isolated behaviors; and a domain of stereo-
types and unfounded beliefs, not just accuracy and rationality.
Susan M. Wolf, Beyond "Genetic Discrimination": Toward the Broader Harm of Geneti-
cism, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHIrCs 345, 347 (1995).
Richard McCormick makes the point with respect to preferential breeding for supe-
rior genotypes. "[T]he most glaring defect in preferential breeding is the perversion of our
own attitudes: we begin to value the person in terms of the trait that he or she was
programmed to have. We reduce the whole to a part." Richard A. McCormick, Blasto-
mere Separation: Some Concerns, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 15; see also
Lippman, supra note 34, at 18.
43. The "people first" approach prefers describing a person who has a disabling con-
dition as a "person with a disability," rather than a "disabled person." For example, the
preference is for a "child with mental retardation" over a "mentally retarded child" and for
a "person with a spinal cord injury" over a "quadriplegic." See Allan H. Macurdy, Disabil-
ity Ideology and the Law School Curriculum, 4 B.U. Pu. INT. L.J. 443, 443 n.1 (1995).
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sons)44 into their traits and, consequently, to see persons as nothing
more than the sum of their parts (i.e., traits), rather than as something
greater than the sum of their parts. 45 The possibility of reductivism
appears particularly troublesome for two reasons. First, it threatens
the loss of an intangible aspect of how we view our fellow humans.
Our very respect for the dignity of the individual, a respect on which
liberal society is based, seems premised on our understanding that
each individual represents a unique bundle of humanity or, stated dif-
ferently, that each individual is greater than the sum of his or her
parts. If, by contrast, we were to view our children or the persons with
whom we interact in society as simply a combination of traits, then
persons with similar traits would begin to appear largely fungible, and
we would lose an important sense of the humanity and individuality of
persons. 46
Second, reducing our understanding of individuals to the sum of
their traits also threatens to create new, and exacerbate existing, bases
for social division.47 Many of the seemingly intractable social divi-
sions of our day are traceable, at least in part, to social groups focus-
ing on one "part" of individuals (for example, their race, ethnicity,
religion, or sexual orientation), rather than on their humanity. It is
easy to hate and castigate a label; it is more difficult to hate an indi-
vidual when one views that individual as being a bundle of human-
ity-with joys, fears, dreams, concerns, vulnerabilities, and strengths.
44. Michael Shapiro previously has described how technology may lead to the break-
down or disassembly of existing conceptual systems or moral frameworks. See Shapiro,
Flying Squirrels, supra note 41, at 352; see generally Michael H. Shapiro, The Technology of
Perfection: Performance Enhancement and the Control of Attributes, 65 S. CAr.. L. REv. 11
(1991).
45. Professors Dreyfuss and Nelkin cite a striking example of this reductivist attitude:
During a presentation on the Human Genome Project, a researcher pulled out a compact
disk and announced to his audience, "This is you." See Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 36,
at 319.
46. Professors Dreyfuss and Nelkin have discussed a related concern, which they label
"genetic essentialism." Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 36, at 320-21. They describe "ge-
netic essentialism" as positing "that personal traits are predictable and permanent, deter-
mined at conception, 'hard-wired' into the human constitution." Id. While Professors
Dreyfuss and Nelkin broadly acknowledge that "[g]enetics has profoundly altered the per-
ception of personhood within our culture," their article focuses principally on how genetic
essentialism affects normative constructs of community, responsibility, and opportunity
embodied in our legal system. Id. at 315.
Similarly, Professor Lippman has described "geneticization" as "an ongoing process
by which differences between individuals are reduced to their DNA codes, with most disor-
ders, behaviors and physiological variations defined, at least in part, as genetic in origin."
Lippman, supra note 34, at 19.
47. Cf. Wolf, supra note 42, at 347-49 (comparing "geneticism" to racism and sexism).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
By encouraging us to conceptually break down persons into traits,
prenatal genetic testing threatens to reinforce our existing and de-
structive reductivist tendencies.
Now, at this point in my commentary, I can almost hear Professor
Shapiro interrupting to raise a concern: "Isn't this whole line of rea-
soning rather speculative?" Of course it is. While Lori Andrews has
commandeered an impressive amount of empirical data on how pre-
natal genetic testing affects the culture of motherhood, I have no hard
evidence that prenatal genetic testing and selective abortion lead to
reductivist attitudes. I am not convinced, however, that the label
"speculative" must be seen as damning all arguments in this context.
To consider the potential impact of procedures not yet in common
practice, such as gene therapy for enhancement purposes, it seems we
must speculate. And even when we consider practices already in-
creasingly widespread, like prenatal genetic diagnosis and selective re-
duction, prudence would counsel us to try to anticipate untoward
consequences, so that we can try to avert those consequences to the
extent possible. After all, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure.
]IlL A Focus on Context
So where do these speculations leave me? They leave me con-
cerned that some practices employed in conjunction with the new re-
productive technologies risk the erosion of our sense of the humanity
and individuality of persons and our sense of connection between par-
ent and child. That said, I hasten to add that I recognize that, of
course, the values, the intuition, the sense of proportion, and (with all
due apologies to Professor Shapiro) the cognitive errors displayed in
this commentary are only my own. Consequently, I do not presume to
assert that the specific practices addressed in this commentary should
be prohibited based on the concerns articulated; nor do I suggest that
the use of selective reduction or prenatal testing is necessarily a basis
for ethical criticism of the actors involved. The motivations and cir-
cumstances involved in reproductive decision making are far too va-
ried for across-the-board judgments.
What I will assert, however, is that we who are concerned about
the impact of assisted reproduction on our sense of personhood could
find value in paying closer attention to the context in which persons
considering whether and how to employ new reproductive technolo-
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gies make their decisions.48 Specifically, I propose that we should be
spending more time thinking and talking about how those contexts
might be shaped to encourage meaningful information transmission,
values clarification, and reflection. We should be concerned about
what goes on in the fertility clinics and the genetic counselor's office
and other venues in order to ensure that persons seeking assistance
get the information they need to make decisions-information not
only about medical risks and benefits, but also about the psychologi-
cal, social, and ethical implications of their decisions.
Beyond attending to the immediate context of decisions, we
need-and this is a much larger task-to occupy ourselves with the
larger social, cultural, and economic context in which women make
reproductive choices. 49 The purpose of improving the immediate de-
cision-making context is to allow women and couples to reach
thoughtful decisions consistent with their values, beliefs, and desires.
To the extent that economic or social constraints impede women's
ability to implement these decisions, however, the increased attention
to immediate context will not truly enhance "free choice," 50 and in-
deed, in some cases, may only create heartache. 51
48. I am not the first to suggest the importance of the context in which decisions
regarding the use of reproductive technologies are made. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note
7, at 233 (suggesting ways to attempt to assure the responsible use of reproductive technol-
ogies); Rayna Rapp, Chromosomes and Communication: The Discourse of Genetic Coun-
seling, in NEw APPROACHES TO HUMAN REPRODUCrlON: SOcIAL AND ETHICAL
DIMENSIONs 25, 25 (Linda M. Whiteford & Marilyn L. Poland eds., 1989) (exploring the
social impact and cultural interpretations of prenatal diagnosis in the context of genetic
counseling).
49. See Lippman, supra note 34, at 49 (stressing importance of considering prenatal
testing decisions in relation to "time and place and.., the broader health and social policy
agenda of which they are a part"); cf. Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the
Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1559, 1561 (1991). As Professor Williams argues:
[Fleminists need to become more self-conscious about the gender eddies that
swirl around the rhetoric of choice.... [Of course, choice always occurs with
constraints. Where one's goal is not to defend a realm of freedom currently en-
joyed, but to challenge the constraints limiting that "freedom," the rhetoric of
choice helps reinforce the gender structures feminists need to challenge.
Id.
50. See Lippman, supra note 34, at 32, 35 (giving example of a woman who may feel
compelled to terminate a pregnancy not because she sees the diagnosed genetic anomaly
itself as a reason for abortion, but because of her financial inability to provide for the
child's special needs).
51. Barbara Katz Rothman, in writing about women's experience with amniocentesis,
describes the illusory nature of "choice" exercised within constraints.
The whole thing about the new technology that they [women] are offered is
that it gives choice. That is what it is all about, after all, the opening up of new
reproductive choices. But for most women the choices are all so dreadful that
trying to find one she can live with is terribly hard. Taking the least-awful choice
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If we were to pay more heed to the context-both immediate and
broader-in which decisions regarding the new reproductive technol-
ogies are made, what might happen? In some cases, we might see
couples deciding to limit the number of embryos transferred to the
woman following IVF to two or three, even though that limitation
would lower the odds of a successful pregnancy.52 Nonetheless, some
couples might decide that they are willing to accept the lower odds in
return for assuredly avoiding a high order multiple pregnancy and the
dilemma posed by the availability of selective reduction. 53
Or, if we paid more regard to context, we might see more preg-
nant women consciously focusing on whether the traits for which they
are considering prenatal testing would significantly detract from their
reasons for choosing to bring new life into the world, rather than sim-
ply acceding to social, medical, or financial pressures to engage in test-
ing.5 4 As Adrienne Asch thoughtfully reflects:
is not experienced as "choosing," not really. It is experienced as being trapped,
caught.
These women are not the villains some would have us believe, aborting fe-
tuses it would be inconvenient to raise, searching for the "perfect" child. They
are the victims. They are the victims of a social system that fails to take collective
responsibility for the needs of its members, and leaves individual women to make
impossible choices. We are spared collective responsibility, because we individu-
alize the problem. We make it the woman's own. She "chooses," and so we owe
her nothing.
BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, THE TENTATIVE PREGNANCY: How AmNiocENTEsis
CHANGES THE EXPERIENCE OF MOTHERHOOD 180-81, 189 (1993).
52. In England a regulatory body (the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Author-
ity) restricts most transfers to no more than three embryos. Robert M.L. Winston & Alan
H. Handyside, New Challenges in Human In Vitro Fertilization, 260 SCIENCE 932, 932
(1993). Of course, this approach of limiting the number of embryos transferred provides
little ethical comfort for persons who view in vitro embryos as morally equivalent to ten
week old fetuses, for if a successful pregnancy does result from the initial transfer, the
untransferred, "surplus" human embryos may be destroyed. In order to avoid the ethical
dilemma, persons believing in the sanctity of in vitro human embryos could choose either
to donate untransferred embryos to another infertile person, rather than destroying them,
or simply attempt to fertilize no more than three oocytes as part of a single cycle of IVF.
53. When hyperstimulation of the ovaries is followed by insemination, and not in vitro
fertilization, the risk is less controllable. The medical literature suggests that monitoring of
hormone levels, in combination with ultrasonography, may be able to reduce, but not to-
tally eliminate, the risk of high order multiple pregnancy by monitoring follicular develop-
ment. Evans, Evolving Patterns, supra note 8, at 1753.
54. See Andrews, supra note 4, at Part I (citing to empirical evidence of pressures).
Simply by creating a choice and thus establishing responsibility for the consequences of the
choice made, prenatal testing may place pressures on women to undergo testing and to
abort when testing shows a disability. "If a test is available and a woman doesn't use it, or
completes the pregnancy although she has been told that her child will have a disability,
the child's disability is no longer an act of fate. She is now responsible; it has become her
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We all... must honestly acknowledge what we value and individu-
ally seek in being parents.... Seeking to avoid the experience of
raising disabled children is no crime or callous, selfish statement, as
some may claim. It is an honest, understandable, if perhaps mis-
informed, response to the fears that a disabled child will not fulfill
what most women seek in mothering .... Let us frame our thinking
about prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion in a sincere discus-
sion of what we long for in the experience of having children. Let
us then ask how a child's disability will compromise that dream.55
Ultimately, though, the reason I advocate attending to questions
of context is not because that attention will necessarily produce out-
comes that are "better" or less threatening to personhood. Rather, by
shaping contexts that encourage moral reasoning and reflection, we
will buttress our humanity and our understanding of personhood
against any assaults that the new reproductive technologies might
mount.
To illustrate my point, let me offer a parable. Let us imagine that
we all dwell together in Fort Personhood, a special spot in the uni-
verse that we love dearly and wish to protect. One day, we spy on the
horizon masses of persons mounted on horses riding toward us with
great haste. As we in Fort Personhood do not know with certainty
whether these intruders are friend or foe, we are somewhat uneasy:
What if they are coming to do harm to Fort Personhood? We could
respond by immediately taking steps to repel the trespassers, to make
sure we beat them away before they can do any harm. Of course, this
approach bears a risk, for they may be bringing us goodwill and gifts
that would enhance our common life in Fort Personhood. It seems
unwise to act decisively-either to greet or to repel-until we have a
better sense of whether the invaders bring us good or ill. So what can
we do in the meantime? My suggestion is to strengthen and build up
our walls. Fortifying the walls of Fort Personhood can only help us.
Returning to the possible threats to personhood posed by repro-
ductive technologies: We can build up our walls by paying attention
to the context that surrounds decisions about the uses of those tech-
nologies. After all, the ability to engage in moral reasoning is an attri-
bute that most would agree is central to our personhood, and the self-
definition that occurs through the process of values-based reasoning
makes us more human irrespective of the outcomes that are reached.
fault." Hubbard, supra note 38, at 232. Of course, this line of reasoning raises the question
whether a woman who knowingly brings into the world a child with a severe genetic anom-
aly should bear some legal liability to the child.
55. Asch, supra note 37, at 86.
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Accordingly, our focus on shaping contexts should have the pur-
pose of encouraging moral reasoning and conscience searching by the
individuals involved in the process, not of attempting to promote cer-
tain outcomes. In this respect, I echo those who stress the importance
of respecting individuals' liberty to make reproductive decisions for
themselves. At the same time, however, simply exercising the right to
choose among alternatives does not by itself further the ideal of au-
tonomy that most strengthens our personhood.5 6 Instead, the auton-
omy that we should value most highly in this context depends upon
educated, reflective, and values-based decision making.5 7
Although I leave to another day the task of describing how we
can shape contexts to achieve the desired goal of strengthening our
personhood, let me offer a few preliminary ideas. Although I stress
the importance of individual decision making, some role for regula-
tory action or professional standards may be appropriate if those ac-
tions and standards are designed to enhance individual decision
making, and not to promote a certain outcome. Examples may in-
clude the development of professional standards by obstetricians and
fertility specialists, perhaps in conjunction with psychologists and so-
cial workers, regarding a baseline of information that should be pro-
vided to prospective patients who seek infertility treatment, and the
formation of support groups for infertility patients that encourage dis-
cussion of ethical and societal issues. Or perhaps fertility clinics could
be required to pay the salary of counselors, who would operate under
the aegis of an independent agency, to provide counseling for clinic
patients.
A rich dialogue has already emerged regarding the role of genetic
counselors in counseling women and couples with respect to prenatal
diagnosis. While general agreement exists that counseling should be
nondirective in scrupulously respecting patient autonomy, some com-
mentators argue that nondirectiveness should not be conflated with
56. To illustrate with an extreme example: A person who bases all binary decisions in
his life on the outcome of coin tosses is exercising his right to decide among alternatives.
His choices, however, presumably will reflect little of his personal values and goals (except,
perhaps, some commitment to arbitrary decision making), and this process of choosing is
unlikely to contribute to his development of a sense of personal identity. Moreover, I
would guess that most people would find such a practice unfathomable, and probably in-
consistent with how we expect persons to act. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 1, at text accompa-
nying note 19 (discussing aspects of autonomy).
57. I recognize that I am describing an ideal of autonomy, and I do not suggest that
the autonomy of persons acting in a less reflective manner is undeserving of respect. See
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETmICS 121-24
(4th ed. 1994) (discussing theories of autonomy).
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moral neutrality.58 In other words, the genetic counselor may play an
important role in identifying, and helping the patient autonomously
address, the ethical and social issues raised.59 This growing scholarly
attention to the role of values in genetic counseling, however, is taking
place against the backdrop of a practical recognition of the enormous
difficulties in assuring that the growing number of pregnant women
for whom prenatal diagnostic services are offered receive even mini-
mally acceptable counseling.60
Many challenges await us if we seek to shape the contexts in
which reproductive decisions are made in an effort to boost both the
role of conscience and freedom of choice for individual patients.
Doubtless, some models for what we might aspire to already exist.6 1
Nonetheless, the current boom in the highly profitable market for in-
fertility treatment has created contexts that are too often inimical to
values-based reasoning. Thus, as we continue to explore the implica-
tions of new reproductive technologies, a worthy goal would be to en-
sure that all choices regarding the use of reproductive technologies
are made in settings that enhance, rather than detract from, our
personhood.
58. See e.g., Robert Wachbroit & David Wasserman, Patient Autonomy and Value-
Neutrality in Nondirective Genetic Counseling, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y Rv. 103 (1995) (argu-
ing that nondirective patient counseling does not require value-neutrality); Arthur R.
Caplan, Neutrality is Not Morality: The Ethics of Genetic Counseling, in PRESCRIBING OUR
FUTuRE: ETHicAL CHALLENGES IN GENETIC COUNSELING 149 (Dianne M. Bartels et al.
eds., 1993) (arguing that the time has come to abandon the ethic of moral neutrality in
genetic counseling).
59. In addition to the issues suggested in this commentary, the coincidence of increas-
ing prenatal diagnostic capabilities with mounting pressures to contain medical costs is
likely to present an issue that will challenge the moral neutrality of genetics counselors.
"Political pressure for genetic counselors to take a normative stance, which accommodates
society's need to decrease the cost of diseases and disorders with strong hereditary origins,
will escalate as more becomes known about the role played by heredity in human health."
Caplan, supra note 58, at 155-56.
60. Professor Andrews has noted:
Increasingly, prenatal diagnostic services are being provided not in genetic
centers, but in private hospitals and clinics, and or in the offices of obstetricians
and family physicians. There is little standardization in how services are pro-
vided, and the majority of women undergoing prenatal testing may receive only a
subset of the counseling previously described [as desirable]. Some receive group
counseling with or without individual assessment and counseling, some receive
written information, and some receive information over the telephone prior to
testing. Procedures for informed consent also vary widely.
ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 168 (Lori B.
Andrews et al. eds., 1994) (citation omitted).
61. Dr. Mary Martin's description of the education and values clarification process
that she goes through with patients at UCSF's IVF program comes to mind. See Mary
Martin, M.D., Address at the Hastings Law Journal Symposium (Feb. 10, 1996).
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